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Delayed Currency Reform and 
 China-Japanese Railway Competition
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Abstract
This article argues that Zhang Xueliang considered the sharp fluctuation of silver prices 
as an effective tool to hedge his counterpart in Japan. In the short run, it turned out to be 
valid for him to impair Japan’s growing economic control on Northeast China and further 
cultivate China’s economic strength. It also helps us to better understand why Zhang 
Xueliang decided to delay the currency reform from the existing silver standard system to 
the new gold standard system. Considering the domestic economic situation back then, it 
was obvious that abandoning the silver standard system could be regarded as a rational 
choice rather than the other way around. However, from the perspective of handling the 
economic relations with Japan, maintaining the silver standard was a better choice.
The crash of silver prices ended up causing a dramatic collapse of freight rates in 
Chinese domestic railways, which pushed a large number of transportation services to be 
transferred to Chinese railway network. Also, it seriously hit the earnings of the South 
Manchuria Railway and put it into a dilemma. Therefore, Zhang Xueliang viewed this as a 
crucial opportunity to fight against the South Manchuria Railway, and gradually trans-
ferred the control of transportation, economy and industry back to the hands of Chinese.   
Under such a severe situation, the South Manchuria Railway offered to hold negotia-
tions on the railway issue since January, 1931. However, Zhang Xueliang did not want to 
reach a quick agreement with Japan, and he decided to take a delay strategy during the 
negotiations and hoped to damage the South Manchuria Railway as long as possible. 
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1. Introduction
Since the 1920s, the currency system in Northeast China had been in a state of chaos. There were 
more than 100 different kinds of currencies in Northeast China, including foreign currencies of 
Japan, which had greatly damaged the proper development of economy, finance, industries and 
commerce in this region(?? 1932?pp.11-24). What’s more, as China still adopted the silver 
standard system, the crash of silver prices since 1929 further put an inevitable impact on China’s 
currencies more seriously. 
The Feng Warlord (????) realized that it was important for China to promote currency 
reform, so as to strengthen the credibility of the Fengpiao (?? ) and further safeguard the national 
interest from other foreign currencies. After Zhang Zuolin (???) took the power of controlling 
the Northeast China politically, he tried to establish a central bank system to unify the currency 
circulation since early 1920s (???  1964?pp.814-815). And it greatly affected the realization of 
Japan’s strategic objectives in this region.  After Zhang Zuolin was murdered in 1928, his son Zhang 
Xueliang (???) announced the replacement of all flags (??) and China was symbolically 
reunified as a complete country. In addition, Zhang Xueliang also poured great efforts into 
promoting currency reforms and effectively resisting the financial invasion from Japan (?? 1992?
pp.507-553??? 1930?pp.29-30).
Under the historical context like above, many people considered that the Northeast China should 
discard the obsolete system of the silver standard and adopt a new currency system of gold 
standard or gold exchange standard system, and further promoted the currency unification process 
(?????1927?p.2). Indeed, the traditional silver standard system caused a significant level of 
economic losses for both international trade and currency exchanges at that time, and many 
Qianzhuang (?? ) and Yinhao (?? ) (old-style Chinese private banks) could not avoid a series of 
repeated bankruptcies in turns. At the same time, Japan tried to exploit this opportunity to stockpile 
a large amount of agricultural products from Northeast China (???1930.01.20?p.1). 
In addition, an official report written by the Financial Consolidation Committee of Northeast 
Provinces of China (?????????? ) also pointed out the advantages for Northeast China 
to adopt the gold standard system: ?the three provinces have already used gold and silver 
currencies simultaneously, so it is not difficult to adopt the gold standard system; the three 
provinces maintain the trade surplus status, so it is not necessary to accumulate a large amount of 
gold reserves; the circulating currencies in the three provinces are mostly banknotes, so it is easy to 
recall them; there are many gold mines in the three provinces, so it will be more convenient for 
storing gold reserves? (??? 1931?pp.8-14). Although Zhang Xueliang was fully aware of the 
serious economic drawbacks fundamentally rooted from the existing silver standard, he did not take 
an immediate action of transforming the entire structure for currency system. On the contrary, he 
intentionally delayed Northeast China’s transformational process toward the gold standard and 
audaciously determined to accept the consequences mostly caused by the meltdown of silver prices. 
If so, why did Zhang Xueliang make this kind of irrational decision? And why did he intend to delay 
131
the transformational process to the gold standard or the gold exchange standard system?
This article aims to argue that Zhang Xueliang considered the sharp fluctuation of silver prices as 
an effective tool to hedge his counterpart in Japan. In the short run, it turned out to be valid for him 
to impair Japan’s growing economic control on Northeast China and further cultivate China’s 
economic strength. 
2. Literature Review
Why did Zhang Xueliang delay the transformational process to the gold standard or the gold 
exchange standard system? First, some previous studies argue that the initial conditions for 
adopting the gold standard were still not mature enough to be institutionalized or materialized. In 
this sense, Su Jing points out that ?our economic strength was still not enough to adopt the gold 
standard, and the gold exchange standard system will also hurt our economic independence. 
Therefore, the Northeast China should follow the silver standard and wait for a more suitable time? 
(?? 1929a, pp.1-3). And the Financial Consolidation Committee of Northeastern China also 
emphasizes that ?the costs of minting gold coins and raising reserves were extremely huge, which 
was too difficult for China? (??? 1931?p.13).
Second, some existing literatures mention that Zhang Xueliang hoped to maintain a strong level 
of consistency with the inner China (??) in currency system narrowly and avoid unnecessary 
economic division or conflicts broadly. Nishimura argues that Zhang Xueliang pursued the goal of 
the financial unification with the inner China, thus persisted in conducting the currency reforms 
based on the original silver standard (?? 1992?p.542). Fujii argues that the Nanjing Government 
was calling for a unified currency system across the whole China, so it was hard to adopt a monetary 
system which was totally different from the central government (?? 1930?pp.3-4). Nomura 
defines this phenomenon as the Centralization of Three Northeast Provinces (??????), which 
indicated that Zhang Xueliang tried to be consistent with the central government on structural 
issues (?? 1961?p.85). Lin Quanqing indicates that ?considering the internal economic and 
political relations with Shanghai, Tianjin, Shandong, etc., the Northeast China should not adopt the 
gold standard before the inner China. The silver standard was still the more appropriate choice? (?
?? 1929?p.25). Furthermore, if the Northeast China had decided to jump into transforming to 
the gold standard prior to the other parts of China and simultaneously purchased a large amount of 
gold in a short period of time, it would have inevitably affected the global supply chain of the gold 
and silver markets and aggravate the chronic depreciation of silver prices, which would finally 
worsen the entire economy of inner China (??? 1931?p.14).
Third, Japan’s Bank of Korea actively promoted the circulation of gold notes (??) in the 
Northeast China. Namikata argues that Japan wanted to promote the Korea-Manchuria Financial 
Integration and enlarge the Gold Yen Bloc (??????). Therefore, Japan hoped to help 
Manchuria change to the gold standard system (???p.408). If Zhang Xueliang had abandoned 
the silver standard, it would have inevitably resulted in eliminating China’s institutional shield 
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against the monetary expansion of Japanese gold notes in this region. Hence, as an endeavor to 
resist Japan’s economic aggression, ?there was no alternative other than silver standard? (??? 
1929?p.25). Su Jing argues that ?it was more important to ban foreign currencies than implement 
currency reform in the Northeast China? (?? 1929b?p.6). In addition, adopting the silver 
standard would also help combat Japan’s dumping policy and the gold notes standard (????) 
policy (?????1929?p.74). Yang Yi further points out that ?foreign capital has caused great 
damage to the Northeast China, and the deadliest was the Japanese gold notes? (?? 1929?p.3).
Fourth, some studies argue that low exchange rate brought about by the falling silver price was 
conductive for China’s foreign trade. Haggard emphasizes that if a country want to adopt an export-
oriented strategy, its exchange rate policy preference always tends to be currency depreciation 
(Haggard 1990, pp.24-25). Guo Zhihua points out that with the development of the international 
agricultural product market in the late 1920s, Zhang Xueliang was making use of the low exchange 
rate to promote exports of agricultural products (????p.13).
The existing studies analyze some reasons why Zhang Xueliang delayed the transition to the gold 
standard or the gold exchange standard system. However, these explanations seem to ignore the 
economic competition between China and Japan in the Northeast China. During this period of time, 
the silver standard and the change of gold-silver ratio became an important tool for Zhang Xueliang 
to deal with its economic relations with Japan, and further expel Japan’s control of Northeast China’s 
economy. This article finds that by maintaining the silver standard system, Zhang Xueliang success-
fully gained some additional leverage or bargaining power he could not have before, so as to protect 
its national interests as much as possible (??? 2018?p.48).
The core economic contradiction then was the railway issue, and the South Manchuria Railway 
(??)  played an important role in Japan’s control of the Northeast China. It commanded the trans-
portation and industries in this region and limited the desirable development of Chinese domestic 
railways. However, the South Manchuria Railway adopted the gold notes standard in freight rates 
(??) settlement, while the Chinese railways adopted the silver standard. The crash of silver prices 
led to a sharp decrease of freight rates in Chinese domestic railways, which caused a large number 
of transportation services to be transferred to Chinese railway network. In due course, it seriously 
hit the earnings of the South Manchuria Railway and put it into a dilemma of managing the current 
business model (?? 1983?p.113). Therefore, Zhang Xueliang viewed it as a crucial opportunity to 
fight against the South Manchuria Railway, and gradually transferred the de facto control of trans-
portation, economy and industry back to the hands of Chinese.
3. The Consequences of Gold-Silver Ratio Change and Zhang Xueliang’s Choice
Since the crash of silver prices in 1929, the gold-silver ratio had also undergone major changes, 
which brought great challenges and opportunities for both Chinese and Japanese governments. The 
key factor depended on who could successfully adapt to these changes much faster at first and then 
formulate corresponding policies for years to come.
133
3.1 Gold-Silver Ratio Change and Its Impacts on South Manchuria Railway 
The South Manchuria Railway had been influenced by silver price changes since its estab-
lishment (? ? ? 2007?p.110). However, there had been no such sharp silver price fluctuations 
like 1929. As mentioned above, it made the freight rates of Japanese railways increase rapidly. The 
farmers and enterprises in Northeast China began to use China’s state-owned railways to transport 
agricultural products and minerals. At that time, railway transportation, as well as ports and mines, 
accounted for around 63.5? of the total earnings of the South Manchuria Railway, so it was 
damaged seriously and its profits had been significantly reduced (?? 1991a??? ).
In addition, as Japan lifted the gold embargo in the early 1930, the gold-silver ratio continued to 
expand, which further reduced the competitive advantage of Japanese railways. The Consul Arakawa 
Mitsuo realized that this might be an important means for China to absorb freight and passenger 
transportation. Not only did China take advantage of changes in gold-silver ratio, it also took the 
initiative to further reduce the freight rates on its state-owned railways (??? 1930?p.2). Some 
employees of South Manchuria Railway also regarded it as China’s planned and organized action to 
oppress Japanese railways, causing them to end up with bigger deficits (??? 1931?pp.3-4).
In order to reduce costs, the South Manchuria Railway chose to take massive layoffs. In 1930, a 
total of 899 employees were laid off, and this figure rose to 2014 in 1931 (??? 2007?p.112???
??1930a.06.25?p.8). The reduction of personnel also began to weaken South Manchuria Railway’s 
control of the Northeast China. 
At this point, the bilateral competition between Japanese railways and Chinese state-owned 
railways became  highly obvious and fierce (?????1931?p.3). This kind of competition was 
prominently manifested in two aspects: one was passenger and freight transportation, and the other 
was transportation routes. The passenger revenue of Japan’s railways dropped by 34.3? in 1930 and 
Table 1  the Changes of Gold-Silver Ratio from 1925 to 1931
Year 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Gold-Silver Ratio 29.38 32.88 36.22 35.26 38.24 53.38 71.30
Source? ??????????1996?????????????????1927-1937??????????????
410??
Table 2  Revenues and Expenses of the South Manchuria Railway
Year Revenue?yen? Expense?yen? Profit?yen?
1929 240,998,062.130 195,492,205.090 45,505,857.040
1930 188,104,062.660 166,430,600.710 21,673,461.950
1931 187,054,401.670 174,455,781.950 12,598,619.720
1932 245,940,674.490 184,652,949.540 61,287,724.950
Source???????????1991????????? 7??????????????
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continued to drop by 20.3? in 1931. Besides, the freight income of Japan’s railways dropped by 
22.9? in 1930 and continued to drop by 9? in 1931 (?? 1991a?p.274??? 1991b?p.286). 
More importantly, Zhang Xueliang continuously built his own branch lines and new ports, which 
was in an attempt to replace the transportation routes through the railways and ports controlled by 
Japan (??? 1931a?p.2).
All these have seriously challenged Japan’s core interests in Northeast China. Japan also realized 
that the key to this problem lay in the changes on gold-silver ratio and the freight rates gap between 
China and Japan. Therefore, Japan started to negotiate with Zhang Xueliang on the freight rates 
issue, but Zhang refused to make adjustments quickly. Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, 
Japan realized that the negotiations could not achieve any results, and announced that the South 
Manchuria Railway adopted the silver standard in its settlements (???? 1931?p.60?????
1931?p.12). But in the end, Japan completely solved this problem through war.    
3.2 Zhang Xueliang’s Choice of Maintaining the Silver Standard System
At that time, Zhang Xueliang was faced with two choices: abandoning the silver standard so as to 
minimize the negative effects of falling silver prices, or maintaining the silver standard as a means 
to combat the South Manchuria Railway? The former option focused on maintaining the financial 
and currency stability in the Northeast China and solving the immediate difficulties. However, the 
latter emphasized the exclusion of foreign control and eliminated the structural obstacles for 
Chinese domestic industries..
The chambers of commerce and ordinary people strongly urged for the adoption of gold standard 
system since early 1930, and the Northeast Administration Committee (???????) had to 
respond in July 1930 that it began to discuss the implementation of gold standard system (???
1930b.07.09,p.6). Then Zhang Xueliang organized the Financial Consolidation Committee of 
Northeast Provinces of China to explore the currency reform plan. This committee published a 
report in late 1930, which agreed to the future goal of establishing the gold standard system, but it 
still believed that the most reasonable system at present was ?a combined system of gold and silver? 
(????). It emphasized that there were two prices under this system, namely a gold-standard 
price and a silver-standard price (??? 1931?p.170). The silver standard price could help to 
reduce the freight rates and the burden of ordinary people, which was very necessary at that time. 
Therefore, it could be seen that although the calling for adopting gold standard system was very 
strong, the Northeast Administration Committee was still concerned about the price advantage 
under the silver standard system. It also indicated that the immediate transition to the gold standard 
system was rejected.
A document from the Liaoning Provincial Government clearly showed that China had already 
made freight rates as the main tool to fight against Japanese railways:
?China’s state-owned railways face fierce competition from Japan, so China’s freight rates should 
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be lower than Japan’s, thus they can have advantage in absorbing more transportation. It is an 
important method to combat Japan. At the same time, low freight rates can also reduce the burden 
on Chinese businessmen and farmers, and further promote the development of China’s industry and 
economy? (???1930?JC010-01-003785).
       
Zhang Xueliang realized that he unexpectedly possessed a tool in his policy tool box to confront 
Japan’s control. Some public opinions also began to emphasize China’s big opportunity brought 
about by changes in gold-silver ratio (??? 1931?p.335). Besides, the Northeast Traffic 
Committee (???????) further reduced freight rates and tariffs, and only charge 30? of the 
fare for farmers (?? 1930?p.20). Zhang also emphasized that it was strictly prohibited to collect 
any additional charges or harsh taxes except legal freight rates (???1929?JC010-01-031825). He 
paid close attention to the situation of the South Manchuria Railway and was determined to 
completely expel Japan’s influence (???1931??123?). Indeed, the financial issue had long 
plagued the Feng Warlords since the 1920s, but Japan was obviously a bigger threat for Zhang 
Xueliang. Therefore, it might be a better choice for him to maintain the silver standard and further 
weaken Japan’s economic control over the Northeast China
However, although Zhang Xueliang was faced with an unprecedented opportunity, he must recon-
solidate the financial system on the basis of silver standard at first. Due to severe inflation and 
currency devaluation, many Chinese railway companies were unwilling to accept Fengpiao and 
other Chinese silver banknotes in 1928 (???1928?JC010-01-008166). If it was still impossible to 
curb hyper-inflation, the advantages brought out by gold-silver ratio change would also be 
neutralized. 
Zhang Xueliang ordered to reorganize the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces (???
???) to the central bank of northeast China, and unified the issuance of  currency (???? 1928, 
p.288). At the same time, this central bank and three other bank giants also formed the Joint Issuance 
Reserve Fund (???????) to issue a new silver dollar exchange certificate (??1929, JC010-01-
009988). Before the issuance of new banknote, this central bank purchased a large amount of silver 
bullions in Beiping and Tianjin, and then minted them to silver dollars. The central bank used these 
silver dollars to collect circulating old banknotes, especially Fengpiao. And the new banknote was 
issued after the old banknote recycling rate reached over 60? (around 800 million yuan) (???1930?
JC010-01-009988). 
According to the regulations of the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund, strict management and 
inspection would be implemented so as to ensure the credit of the new currency. For example, the 
issued banknotes must include 70? of silver reserves and 30? of other asset reserves, namely a 
100? reserve ratio. The following table showed 19 times of reserve inspections from June 1929 to 
the end of 1930.
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As could be seen from the table above, the Fund had implemented management of the reserves 
strictly, and the new currency basically maintained its credit and value. And the silver dollar 
exchange certificate had replaced the Fengpiao as the core element in economic operation. Zhang 
Xueliang basically unified the financial system in Northeast China in 1930:
(1)  In official, private, and commercial sectors, the Northeast China has implemented the silver 
dollar (???) standard system.
(2)  All the old local banknotes will be withdrawn and currency issuance will be unified. 
(3)  The Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces will act as the national treasury (?? ) 
of Northeast China (???? 1930?p.13).
Zhang Xueliang promoted the currency unification on the basis of the silver standard system and 
then maintained financial stability in this region as a whole. It had curbed the growing trend of 
inflation and improved the credit and acceptance of Chinese silver banknotes. It created the basic 
conditions for China’s competition with Japanese railways. Backed by this, Zhang began to negotiate 
with Japan on railway issue, and gave full play of the currency power through this process.
Table 3  19 times of Inspections on the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund
Date Issuance amount Silver reserve Other assets
1 1929.06.30  2,000,000  1,400,000  600,000
2 1929.07.30  2,900,000  2,030,000  870,000
3 1929.08.31  3,900,000  2,730,000 1,170,000
4 1929.09.30  5,000,000  3,500,000 1,500,000
5 1929.10.31  5,000,000  3,500,000 1,500,000
6 1929.11.30  5,500,000  3,850,000 1,650,000
7 1929.12.31  8,300,000  5,810,000 2,490,000
8 1930.01.04 10,000,000  7,000,000 3,000,000
9 1930.02.28 10,800,000  7,560,000 3,240,000
10 1930.03.31 11,050,000  7,735,000 3,315,000
11 1930.04.30 11,050,000  7,735,000 3,315,000
12 1930.05.30 11,300,000  7,910,000 3,390,000
13 1930.06.30 11,300,000  7,910,000 3,390,000
14 1930.07.31 11,800,000  8,260,000 3,540,000
15 1930.08.30 13,600,000  9,520,000 4,080,000
16 1930.09.30 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000
17 1930.10.31 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000
18 1930.11.29 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000
19 1930.12.30 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000
Source:  this form is made by the author, and the data came from 19 Inspection Reports on the Joint Issuance 
Reserve Fund ????????????? published by the Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast 
Provinces.
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4. China-Japanese Railway Negotiations and Zhang Xueliang’s Delay Strategy 
Under such severe situation, the South Manchuria Railway offered to hold negotiations on railway 
issue since January, 1931 (???? 2011?p.86). Zhang Xueliang and Director Kimura held several 
rounds of talks in Shenyang, but no consensus has been reached. Japan mainly had two concerns: 
first, Japan hoped to negotiate freight rates with China, so as to reduce the damage caused by the 
change of gold-silver ratio; second, Japan required China not to take this opportunity to develop its 
own railway plan and avoid challenging the core interests of the South Manchuria Railway in 
Northeast China (??? 1931?p.17). Facing with Japan’s aggressive attitudes, Zhang Xueliang did 
not want to reach an agreement with Japan too soon. He took a delay strategy during the negotia-
tions and hoped to damage the South Manchuria Railway as long as possible. 
4.1 Delay Strategy in Freight Rates Negotiations
As mentioned above, the freight rates issue was the root cause of China-Japan railway compe-
tition, and the change of gold-silver ratio gave China a competitive advantage. Therefore, delay was 
the best strategy for China. As long as no agreement was reached, it would be a victory for China.
Some Japanese officials also seemed to be aware of this strategy. Consul-General Hayashi Kyujiro 
mentioned that, ?Chinese representatives always talk about the current situation in an abstract 
manner without addressing specific issues? (???1991?pp.331-332). Director Kimura clearly 
pointed out that Zhang Xueliang tried to avoid any talks, and his delay strategy undermined the 
vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway and intensified the opposition between China and 
Japan (???? 2011?p.57).
Therefore, Japan proposed a detailed plan for dealing with the freight rates issue:
(1) The freight rates should be based on the currency of a third country. (American dollar)
(2) The freight rates must be negotiated in some districts.
(3)  In principle, the freight rates and other fees should be kept the same amount in these 
districts.
(4)  If it is necessary to reduce freight rates, China and Japan need to negotiate in advance (?
??? 2011?pp.124-125).
From this plan, it was clear that Japan hoped to eliminate China’s advantage brought about by the 
change of gold-silver ratio. Japanese representatives also emphasized that it was precisely because 
of the change of gold-silver relations that triggered the current problem, and China surely had the 
ability to make a proper adjustment to it. Chinese representatives seemingly acknowledged the 
necessity of negotiating freight rates, but they were still looking for methods to delay the negotiation 
process (?? 1931?p.56????1931?p.8).
First, Zhang Xueliang and many local media always emphasized that the Northeast Adminis-
tration Committee was a local government and had no right to make the final decision (???
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1931b, p.13). And its railway budgetary power had already been handed over to the Nanjing 
Government (???1929?JC010-01-008111). So he advised that if Japan wanted to solve this 
problem, it also needed to talk with Nanjing (???1931.03.06?p.3). During the entire negotiation 
process, he maintained close communications with Nanjing and sought for its help (???
1931.05.17?p.11). In March 1931, China’s Ministry of Railways convened a national conference on 
freight rates, and suggested Northeast China to adopt lower freight rates to cope with Japan’s 
competition (???1930?JC010-01-003785). Therefore, Zhang Xueliang flexibly used his subtle 
relations with Nanjing Government to achieve the purpose of additional delay.
Second, some Chinese representatives emphasized the inequality in Japan’s proposal on freight 
rates. They believed that the strength of Chinese railways lagged far behind that of the South 
Manchuria Railway, so it was unfair for them to adopt the same freight rates (???? 2011?
pp.139-140). However, while negotiating freight rates with Japan, Zhang Xueliang still proactively 
tried to lower the current price, so as to absorb more transportation (???1931?JC010-01-008142). 
It clearly showed that the negotiation was only a matter of means rather than an objective for Zhang 
Xueliang.
Due to the repeated delays in negotiations, Japan seemed to have begun to think whether it 
claimed too much on freight rates. Japan decided to mitigate its tough attitude and adopt a 
conciliation policy (????1931.05.22?p.6). Japan tried to use ?easing loan conditions? as a 
bargaining chip in exchanges for Zhang Xueliang’s concessions (???1991?p.333). However, they 
did not realize that Zhang’s goal was to expel Japanese control ultimately, not making compromises.
4.2 Delay Strategy in China?s Railway Plan
The change of gold-silver ratio would not only help Chinese railways to absorb more transpor-
tation, but also, more importantly, it would help China take this opportunity to promote its own 
railway construction plan. This railway nationalism has greatly hurt Japan’s interests and sparked its 
strong dissatisfaction (?????????p.612).
Japan’s concerns were mainly concentrated on two points: The first was the so-called parallel line 
(???) issue, which aimed to compete positively with the South Manchuria Railway; the second 
was the Huludao (???) port issue, which attempted to establish a new export transportation 
route. Zhang Xueliang hoped to build a Chinese railway network, so as to completely block the 
Japanese railways in a real sense (???1930?JC010-01-008109). And he ordered that Japan should 
be prohibited from building railways and controlling the mines in Northeast China (???1930? 
JC010-01-008294). In addition, Zhang also asked Nanjing to help promote the railway plan (????
?????a?p.441). And then the Nanjing government helped Zhang to negotiate with foreign 
construction companies (except Japanese companies), so as to obtain discounted prices (???1929?
JC010-01-009204).
Therefore, Zhang Xueliang believed that there was a huge gap in opinions between China and 
Japan, and there was no need to promote negotiations too quickly (?????????b?pp.245-246). 
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During the negotiations on the railway plan, Chinese representative Gao Jiyi remained cautious and 
tried to narrow the scope of the negotiations. On the contrary, Japanese representative Kimura had 
been trying to expand the scope of the discussion (???1931?p.8). And it made the negotiations 
deadlocked as China wanted.
In order to speed up the railway construction plan, Zhang Xueliang asked Nanjing Government 
for financial assistance and requested to establish a Northeastern Railway Construction Fund (??
???????c?p.356).  It further convinced Japan that Zhang had firmly established the 
ambition to promote his railway plan. At the same time, Japan also warned that ?if China forcibly 
builds parallel lines and port projects, serious events will inevitably occur. Japan will use all means 
to prevent this from happening? (???1991?pp.331-332).
At this time, Japan seemed to be convinced that the negotiations could not move on in the 
direction that they wanted. Therefore, they sought to change the most basic thing: the gold-silver 
ratio. The South Manchuria Railway decided to move to silver standard from Siping to Yingkou, 
which essentially reduced freight rates (?? 1931?p.17). In addition, other railway lines which still 
adopted the gold standard also drastically cut off freight rates, so as to absorb more transportation 
(?????1931, p.20). The bilateral railway competition between China and Japan was increasingly 
unable to coordinate. Later, the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident finally solved this problem. 
Since October 1931, Japan had completely broken China’s railway plan, and its railway revenue has 
grown rapidly since then (??? 1931?p.2).
5. Conclusion
Why did Zhang Xueliang delay the transition to the gold standard or the gold exchange standard 
system? This article gives a new explanation that Zhang Xueliang wanted to use of the silver prices 
and silver standard as a tool to negotiate with Japan, so as to impair Japan’s economic control on 
Northeast China and further cultivate its own economic strength. Considering the domestic 
economic situation, abandoning the silver standard seemed to be a more rational choice. However, 
from the perspective of handling the economic relations with Japan, maintaining the silver standard 
was a better choice.
The crash of silver prices led to a sharp decrease of freight rates in Chinese domestic railways, 
which caused a large number of transportation services to be transferred to Chinese railways. It 
seriously damaged the earnings of the South Manchuria Railway and put it into a dilemma. 
Therefore, Zhang Xueliang viewed it as a crucial opportunity to fight against the South Manchuria 
Railway, and gradually transferred the control of transportation, economy and industry back to the 
hands of Chinese.   
Under such severe situations, the South Manchuria Railway offered to hold negotiations on 
railway issue since January, 1931. Facing with Japan’s aggressive attitudes, Zhang Xueliang did not 
want to reach an agreement with Japan too soon. He took a delay strategy during the negotiations 
and hoped to damage the South Manchuria Railway as long as possible. 
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This article finds that, by maintaining the silver standard system, Zhang Xueliang successfully 
gained some additional leverage or bargaining power that he could not have before, so as to protect 
its national interests in the best possible manner. It also indicates that weak countries can flexibly 
use economic tools to deal with their relations with stronger powers (??? 2018?p.47).
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